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Clarence Thomas
Part I: Biography
Clarence Thomas is a man of principle, a believer in ideals, and a champion of
perseverance. He is quiet, yet thoughtful, a voracious reader and thinker. He is a father, a husband,
and an associate justice on the Supreme Court of the United States. He has struggled with personal
demons, internal and external challenges to his beliefs, and challenges to his credibility. A
descendant of slaves, he has seen both the best and the worst of America in his lifetime.
Thomas’s ancestors trace back to two plantations in Georgia, namely the Thomas
plantation and the King plantation.1 Thomas’s paternal grandfather, Norman “November”
Thomas, was born in 1907 “into a sharecropping family and picked cotton by hand as a boy.”2
While growing up in the early 1900s, November was exposed to the institutional racism and
violence that continued to plague the South after the Civil War.3 Despite the conditions, November
Thomas would embody traits that would later influence his grandson.4 November championed the
importance of hard work, and was a man of faith.5 One of Clarence Thomas’s cousins, Evelyn
Thomas, recollected that November “would always preach to us . . . as far as doing the right thing,
staying in school . . . getting an education.”6 Like his grandson, November could be firm, but was
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ANDREW PAYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 11-13 (Encounter Books 2001).
Id. at 39.
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Id.
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Id. at 42 (“Clarence Thomas would share many of November’s traits-good-natured but steely-willed, and given to
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Id. at 41.
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often happy, he could speak with authority and decisiveness, but also retained a sense of humor.7
Clarence’s father, M.C. Thomas, was November’s son.8
While Thomas’s paternal grandfather had an influence on him, it was his maternal
grandfather, Myers Anderson, who played the key role in shaping his identity.9 Anderson’s mother
and Thomas’s great-grandmother, Lutricia Allen, died while Myers was young. 10 Anderson’s
father, Isaac, left the family while Myers was young, leaving him to be raised in Liberty County,
Georgia, by his uncles, who by that point had become responsible for sixteen children.11 Myers
worked in the fields, attending school only through third grade.12 Nevertheless, Myers learned how
to read from the nuns at the local St. Benedict’s Church.13 Myers fathered a child named Leola
Anderson, who would be Clarence’s mother.14 Myers later went on to marry another woman,
Christine Anderson, who would be Clarence’s beloved grandmother.15
Clarence Thomas was born in Pin Point, Georgia, on June 23, 1948.16 Thomas was the
middle of three children belonging to M.C. and Leola.17 Clarence’s upbringing was humble,
namely in a house with “a corrugated tin roof and wooden siding caulked with a makeshift epoxy
of flour and water. Newspapers provided both insulation and wallpaper. There was a dirt floor and
no electricity or plumbing.”18 The house was lighted with kerosene lamps and shared an outhouse
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with other neighbors.19 M.C., Thomas’s father, created a quagmire when he impregnated both his
wife, Leola, with a third child, and simultaneously impregnated another woman in the town. 20
Feeling trapped, M.C. took off for Philadelphia, and from then on would not be involved in his
children’s lives.21 Struggling to raise three children on her own, Leola decided to remarry.22 Her
new husband, however, refused to accept her children.23 She decided to send her two sons to live
with their grandparents, Myers and Christine Anderson.24
Thomas’s experience with his grandfather would establish the bedrock of his principles
and beliefs. Myers enforced discipline and a strict schedule, emphasizing education and limiting
idle time.25 Myers consistently emphasized “work, education, and faith.”26 Despite financial
hardship, Anderson pulled both Thomas and his brother out of public school and enrolled them at
the local St. Benedict school.27 The nuns enforced order, academic excellence,28 and did not
succumb to the racial discrimination that continued to permeate the public school systems.29 Myers
enforced near perfect attendance and rigorous study habits,30 and when school was out he kept the
boys busy by having them work for him in operating his business. 31 When Thomas finished his
school obligations and completed his grandfather’s assignments, he was allowed to go to the
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library, and soon became an avid reader.32 Myers Anderson’s teachings would greatly influence
Thomas’s views on welfare and affirmative action.33
After a few years in high school, Thomas decided he would enter the priesthood and
enrolled in St. John Vianney Minor Seminary in 1964.34 Despite being a very strong student,
Thomas developed a habit while at the seminary school that would follow him throughout his
professional career, silence unless called on.35 As Thomas continued to excel in school, he was
increasingly ostracized and subject to racial slurs by the white classmates he surpassed.36 Near the
end of his high school career, Thomas was admitted to Immaculate Conception, a college
seminary, to continue his path toward the priesthood.37 While at college, Thomas was exposed to
the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, which later became an important part of Thomas’s beliefs and
philosophy on the law.38 While at Immaculate Conception, Thomas began to question his faith and
his road to the priesthood, and eventually left the seminary and the Catholic Church altogether.39
Thomas’s grandfather was upset with this news, and kicked him out of the house when Thomas
returned to Georgia.40 Thomas would eventually enroll at Holy Cross College in Massachusetts.41
After Martin Luther King’s death, Holy Cross began an initiative to increase recruitment
efforts for African-American students, which Thomas benefitted from.42 Admittedly, Thomas
departed for Holy Cross “with no hope in [his] religion, no faith in [his] country, and no desire to
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Id. at 73-74.
Myers Anderson once told Thomas, “I never took a penny from the government because it takes your manhood
away . . . I’d prefer to starve to death first.” Id. at 73.
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Id. at 81.
35
Id. at 85.
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Id. at 90.
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Id. at 91.
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be in a predominately white school again.”43 This conflict would make Holy Cross an interesting
time in Thomas’s life. Thomas identified with the Black Power movement, yet at the same time
opposed many of the initiatives by the black students that advanced separatism and putting his
education in jeopardy.44 Thomas would later describe his time at Holy Cross as his “radical” years
and “years of rage.”45 However, despite his interest in Malcolm X46 and his immersion in the
“politics of anger,” Thomas began to question these views, believing that such politics were
ultimately “destructive.”47 Thomas realized that he was reaching a crossroads in his beliefs, namely
whether he believed “in the principles of this country or not[.]”48
While at Holy Cross, Thomas met the woman who would become his first wife, Kathy
Ambush.49 Ultimately, Thomas would graduate cum laude from Holy Cross50 and be accepted into
Yale Law School.51 While at Yale, Thomas would experience first-hand both the positive and
negative effects of affirmative action.52 Thomas once said that “the worst experience of his life
was when whites at Yale told him he was admitted there only because of racial quotas.”53 Thomas
recognized that while these affirmative action programs helped young minorities obtain admission
to schools, they would inevitably be viewed as inferior and only there because of their race.54 Thus,
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Id. at 109.
Id. at 117-18 (when black students at Holy Cross sought to claim their own floor in the dormitory, Thomas would
oppose and say that they were there to “get to know white people and understand their culture.”) See also id. at 123
(Thomas opposed a plan for black students to walk-out at Holy Cross, realizing that it put their education in
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Id. at 128.
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Id. at 129.
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Id.
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Id. at 134.
51
Id. at 133.
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Id. at 141.
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despite being benefitted by affirmative action, Thomas would later oppose it.55 While at Yale,
Thomas moved away from the more liberal viewpoints he espoused while at Holy Cross and would
begin drifting to the right, finding “comfort instead in the philosophy of black self-help enunciated
by Booker T. Washington and, in his own, homespun way, Myers Anderson.”56 Thomas worked
at a civil rights law firm after his second year at Yale,57 but ultimately decided not to accept an
offer there. This misstep cost him as he was rejected from every law firm he applied to thereafter.58
Thomas was left with no job and a pregnant wife.59 In a stroke of luck, Yale alumnus and Missouri
Attorney General John Danforth contacted the school looking for “good African-American
lawyers.”60 After interviews, Thomas accepted Danforth’s offer,61 which allowed Thomas to
establish the connections that would ultimately propel him to Washington, D.C., and thereafter to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Professionally, Thomas was a successful litigator at the Missouri Attorney General’s
office.62 Personally, he continued to hone and sharpen his political philosophy, becoming more
conservative.63 After Danforth left the Attorney General’s office for a seat in the United States
Senate, Thomas began looking for new prospects,64 and eventually landed a lucrative offer as an
in-house attorney at a large company, Monsanto.65 Thomas quickly became bored with this often
tedious, albeit lucrative work, and obtained a position, after two years, as Senator Danforth’s

55

Id. at 143.
Id.
57
Id. at 145.
58
Id. at 148.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 149.
62
Id. at 156-57;167.
63
Id. at 163; 164-165.
64
Id. at 168.
65
Clarence Thomas, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, supra note 16.
56

7

legislative aid.66 When Ronald Reagan won the presidential election in 1980, Thomas saw an
opportunity.67 After attracting the attention of the administration, Thomas secured an appointment
as assistant secretary for civil rights in the Department of Education (OCR).68 Once Thomas
accepted an appointment in the Reagan administration, his marriage dissolved.69 While in this
position, Thomas would hire Anita Hill.70 When he arrived at OCR, Thomas was put in a tough
predicament. The Reagan administration was trying to drive a hard line in opposition to affirmative
action and race policies.71 Thomas, fearing he would lose the support of his liberal staff and the
African-American community, would often push back against these hard line policies proposed by
the administration.72
While Thomas was at OCR, the position of Chairman of the EEOC opened up, and Thomas
would ultimately be offered and would accept the position.73 When Thomas arrived at the EEOC,
he found it in shambles.74 The previous chairman of the EEOC neglected to track money, a
suspicious sum in excess of $1 million had been given out to employees for advances on travel
expenses, for nearly 900 contracts to which the agency was a party, it had no information as to
whether the contracted work was performed, and the payroll system was so outdated that the
agency was issuing checks to “former and deceased employees.”75 The office space was
“environmentally unsound,”76 and there was a huge backload in cases, the magnitude of which no

66

Id.; THOMAS, supra note 1, at 174.
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one knew when Thomas took the position.77 The figure was later determined to be 12,000 cases
pre-1979, and given that the EEOC only disposed of roughly 1,000 cases a year, the backlog would
continue to worsen.78 Thomas, despite push back from yet another ideologically hostile agency,
was able to make significant inroads on cleaning up the EEOC and maximizing its efficiency. 79
However, while Thomas was successful as a manager, he continued to bump heads with members
of the Reagan administration, who pushed for eradication of many of the policies implemented
during the Carter administration.80
During the Reagan administration, Thomas was seen as “an evolving
conservative.”81 Thomas espoused libertarian views during the first Reagan term.82 He firmly
believed in individual rights and opposed extensive governmental intervention.83 As a part of this
philosophy, Thomas believed that individuals should be “judged on the basis of individual merit
and individual conduct . . . not . . . on the basis of accidents of birth or conditions which are
immutable.”84 Although he would later deny such a viewpoint at his confirmation hearing, Thomas
“endorsed a right to life for the unborn,” and therefore at least tacitly opposed the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe v. Wade.85
After Reagan was re-elected for a second term, the administration demanded that Thomas
toe the line on the administration’s civil rights policy, which Thomas reluctantly agreed to. 86
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Id.
Id.
79
Id. at 226.
80
Id. at 239 (refusing to speak out against affirmative action); id. at 240 (denying Department of Justice plan that
refused to comply with federal affirmative action plan); id. at 241-42 (refusing to take a definitive stand against
racial quo quotas).
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Id. at 244.
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Thomas was re-appointed as chairman of the EEOC and survived a rigorous confirmation hearing
by Congress.87 By the late 1980s, Thomas’s philosophy finally congealed, now resembling
“Reagan-style conservatism.”88 As Thomas’s biographer explains, by the conclusion of the 1980s
Thomas’s philosophy had several pillars.89 The first was “distrust of government,” largely based
on his experience with segregation and his experience at the EEOC.90 The second was economic
liberty, derived from his grandfather’s ethos and his belief that economic liberty was the only way
to overcome racism.91 In sum, Thomas’s ideal society “orbited the individual.”92 This philosophy
ties in with Thomas’s allegiance to natural law, which he believed championed individual
autonomy.93
When George H.W. Bush became president, he nominated Thomas to fill a vacant position
on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.94 Thomas would only be there for a
short time before being nominated by President Bush to the United States Supreme Court on July
1, 1991.95 Having already failed to confirm one of Bush’s nominations, both Thomas and the
administration knew that confirmation by the Senate would not be an easy task. 96 Thomas’s
nomination was “instantly controversial,” as he was opposed by both civil rights organizations and
many women’s organizations who feared that headway made on affirmative action and abortion
may be undone.97 After a 7-7 vote by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the nomination was set to
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Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 286.
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Id. at 299.
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Id. at 300.
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Id. at 306 (“Thomas noted that natural law allows society to place firm limits on governmental action and to
ensure individual autonomy.”).
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Id. at 319.
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88

10

go to the full Senate for a vote.98 The proceedings, however, “took a sudden and dramatic turn”
when Anita Hill, who had worked for Thomas in the Department of Education and the EEOC,
came forward to raise allegations of sexual harassment.99 Hill’s allegations proved inconclusive,
and Thomas, after delivering an impassioned speech accusing the Senate Committee of presiding
over a “high-tech lynching,” carried the day.100 Thomas was ultimately confirmed by the Senate,
52-48.101 Thomas’s second wife, Virginia Lamp, would describe the ordeal as the “hardest thing
I’ve ever gone through.”102
Even on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas has continued to receive criticism, he has been
“dismissed as a man of little accomplishment, an opportunistic black conservative who sold out
his race, joined the Republican Party and was ultimately rewarded with an affirmative action
appointment to the nation’s highest court, a sullen, intellectual lightweight so insecure he rarely
opens his mouth in oral arguments.”103 Thomas shuns these critics, emphasizing that his job is to
write opinions.104 Justice Thomas has written over 300 opinions during his tenure on the Supreme
Court.105 When asked if he would ever change his views, as some Justices do when they reach the
bench, Thomas held firm, explaining that “[m]y journey has over the years been almost that of a
prodigal son where you journey away from your roots in the South. And now, I’ve returned to my
roots . . . And that’s why I entitled my book ‘My Grandfather’s Son.’ I have returned to my
grandfather and to the way he raised me. And I think that’s home and that’s where I’ll stay.”106

98

Id.
Id.
100
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 428.
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An Outline of the Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas Controversy,
http://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/122/hill/hillframe.htm, supra note 97.
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CBS NEWS, CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JUSTICE THAT NOBODY KNOWS,
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Part II: Analysis of Opinions
In the 22 years and counting107 that Clarence Thomas has been on the Court, he has been
involved in many major opinions spanning countless areas of law. Thomas’s judicial philosophy
congealed when he joined the Supreme Court, culminating in an originalist perspective on the
Constitution.108 Originalists believe that “the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
its original meaning . . . the meaning it had at the time of enactment.”109 One author further clarifies
that Thomas should be viewed as a “liberal originalist” due to his “willingness to rely on the natural
rights tradition.”110 To be clear, Thomas’s version of originalism diverges with that of his
colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia (who has been referred to as a “conservative originalist”), in that
they “disagree about whether originalism is limited to an interpretation of the Constitution’s
language only, or whether the political-philosophical context of the Constitution’s framing should
also factor into the analysis.”111 Scalia believes that it is the legislature’s duty to provide or deny
“natural rights.”112 Thomas, by contrast, is called a “liberal originalist” because he is more open
to the protection of natural rights, as espoused in the Declaration of Independence.113 Thus view
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Clarence Thomas, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, supra Note 16.
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 474.
109
UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
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Timothy Sandefur, Clarence Thomas’s Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 535, 554.
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Id. at 553.
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to provide or deny a right to abortion”).
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Id. at 554; see also id. at 536 (recognizing Thomas’s belief in “Jeffersonian principles of individual liberty
articulated in the Declaration of Independence”).
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is made clear in Thomas’s opinions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and is driven by
Thomas’s interest in separating the Constitution from slavery.

A. Originalism
Thomas’s strong adherence to originalism manifested itself right away when Thomas
joined the Court.114 Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Doggett v. United States115 is a clear example.
In Doggett, the Court held that an 8 ½ year window between a criminal’s indictment and arrest, as
a result of government negligence, was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial.116 Thomas dissented, explaining that the Speedy Trial Clause was not intended to cover this
type of delay.117 Thomas began his dissent by noting that while Doggett’s story was unusual, even
extraordinary,118 the Court’s conclusion that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was
violated was erroneous because he “suffered none of the harms that the right was designed to
prevent.”119 Thomas explained that the Speedy Trial Clause was designed to protect against the
“major evils” of ‘“undue and oppressive incarceration’ and the ‘anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation.’”120 Doggett, during the 8 ½ years, was never in custody or
subject to bail.121 He was unaware of his indictment, so he did not experience “the anxiety or
humiliation that typically accompanies a known criminal charge.”122 Thus, Thomas reasoned that
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THOMAS, supra note 1, at 474.
112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992).
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Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2694.
117
Id. at 2694-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also THOMAS, supra note 1, at 474.
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Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2694-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Doggett turned his life around from criminal to
homeowner and computer operations manager by the time he was finally tried).
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Id. at 2695.
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Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)).
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because the core concern is impairment of liberty, not delay-related prejudice, Doggett was not
entitled to protection under the Speedy Trial Clause.123 While such a lengthy delay undoubtedly
hinders the defendant’s case, a defendant, where applicable, may still rely on non-constitutional
protections such as statutes of limitations, and other Constitutional protections such as the Due
Process Clause.124
In subpart B of his dissent, Thomas examined English common law to determine that while
delay was disfavored, there was no prohibition preventing prosecution of these cases after time
had elapsed.125 Therefore, Thomas found that Doggett’s case fell outside the purview of the Speedy
Trial Clause. Thomas, addressing the majority, concluded that “[b]y divorcing the Speedy Trial
Clause from all considerations of prejudice to an accused, the Court positively invites the Nation’s
judges to indulge in an ad hoc and result-driven second-guessing of the government’s investigatory
efforts. Our Constitution neither contemplates nor tolerates such a role.”126
A second major dissent in which Thomas expressed strong originalist overtures was
Hudson v. McMillian.127 In that case, the Court was confronted with the issue of whether use of
excessive force by a corrections officer against a prisoner constituted cruel and unusual
punishment where no serious injury resulted.128 According to the prisoner, after a verbal argument
with the corrections officer, he was put in handcuffs, taken out of his cell, and began to be
transported to “administrative lockdown.”129 On the way there, he claimed to have been punched
“in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach” while an accompanying officer held him and kicked and
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Id.
Id. at 2698.
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Id.
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Id. at 2701.
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Id. at 997.
129
Id.
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punched him from behind.130 The prisoner suffered minor injuries including bruises and “swelling
of his face, mouth, and lip,” in addition to loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate.131 The
majority opinion, authored by Justice O’Connor, held that while de minimis use of physical force
does not violate the Eighth Amendment, here the injuries sustained were not de minimis, and
therefore the prisoner’s claim should not have been dismissed.132
Justice Thomas filed a dissent, contending that before a finding of cruel and unusual
punishment can be made, the prisoner must demonstrate that he suffered “significant injury.”133
Thomas qualified this bold statement by explaining that the prisoner is not without recourse;134 he
is just without remedy under the Eighth Amendment. Thomas noted that it is a recent phenomenon
in and of itself that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to “deprivations that were
not inflicted as part of the sentence for a crime.”135 Thomas noted that the background of the
Amendment, including its “English antecedents, its adoption by Congress, its construction by this
Court, and the interpretation of analogous provisions by state courts,” does not provide any support
for the proposition that the Amendment should regulate treatment of prisoners.136 It was not until
185 years after the adoption of the Amendment that it was applied to a case in which a prisoner
claimed mistreatment in prison.137
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Id.
Id.
132
Id. at 1001.
133
Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
134
Thomas explained that the “use of force that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may
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Id. (“For generations, judges and commentators regarded the Eighth Amendment as applying only to torturous
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Justice Thomas explained that the Eighth Amendment has both an objective and subjective
component.138 The Eighth Amendment does not apply to every conceivable deprivation, only to
deprivations “involving ‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of
mind.”139 The majority, Thomas explained, by re-defining the objective component as “contextual
and responsive to contemporary standards of decency,” eliminates the longstanding significant
injury requirement under the Eighth Amendment and reduces the inquiry to a purely subjective
analysis of the prison official’s intent.140 Thomas concluded that the Court’s expansion of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause is an example of the erroneous “view that the Federal Constitution
must address all ills in our society.”141 Abusive behavior by prison guards, while deplorable, is not
per se unconstitutional as the Eighth Amendment is not a code of prison regulation.142
A final opinion in which Thomas strongly adhered to his originalist philosophy is Wilson
v. Arkansas.143 In Wilson, the Court was called upon to decide whether the common law principle
requiring police officers to “knock and announce” their presence before conducting a search of a
home is required under the Fourth Amendment.144 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Thomas, recognized that “[a]t the time of the framing, the common law of search and seizure
recognized a law enforcement officer’s authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but
generally indicated that he first ought to announce his presence and authority.”145 Thomas held
that the “knock and announce” requirement “forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment.”146
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Id.
140
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In this case, petitioner Wilson made a series of drug sales to an informant who was working
with the Arkansas State Police.147 At one transaction, petitioner brandished a firearm and
threatened the informant with death if the informant turned out to be working with the police, but
proceeded to sell the informant drugs anyway.148 The next day, the police obtained a warrant to
conduct a search of the petitioner’s home.149 When the police arrived, they found the main door to
the home open, they then proceeded through an unlocked screen door and identified themselves as
police officers.150 The police uncovered drugs, and found petitioner in the bathroom flushing
marijuana down the toilet.151
In determining whether the knock and announce principle is part of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry, Thomas began by looking at the common law to determine the “traditional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . at the time of the framing.”152 Thomas,
after taking a comprehensive look at the common law, concluded that there is “no doubt that the
reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers
announced their presence and authority prior to entering.”153 Thomas further noted that the “knock
and announce principle” was “woven quickly into the fabric of early American law” in that most
states that ratified the Fourth Amendment also enacted similar constitutional provisions or statutes
that modeled the common law approach.154 In addition to states, early American courts also upheld
the knock and announce principle.155 As a result, Thomas concluded that there was “little doubt
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that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a
dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or
seizure.”156 However, this did not end the inquiry, as not every entry requires the police officers to
knock and announce their presence, such as where there is danger of physical violence, where a
prisoner escapes, or where there is reason to believe evidence would be destroyed.157 Thomas
ultimately remanded the case for a determination of whether these factors were present.158
Importantly, however, Thomas maintained his originalist perspective in deciding the outcome of
the case.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
Thomas’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as discussed above, is derived from
his view that the original intent of the Constitution is to bring about the guarantees of the
Declaration of Independence. Thomas views the Constitution as colorblind, and therefore abhors
any disparate treatment based on race. Thomas, as discussed below, has also sought to revive the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as a means to protect substantive rights under the Constitution,
as he feels that route is more in touch, and more consistent with, the original intent of the framers.
1. Equal Protection Clause
Thomas has been consistently vocal in his opposition to affirmative action admissions
criteria for universities. In 2003, the Court considered two major affirmative action cases, Gratz v.
Bollinger159 and Grutter v. Bollinger.160 In Gratz, the Court considered the issue of whether the
University of Michigan’s system of using racial preference in its undergraduate admissions process
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violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.161 Two students, Jennifer Gratz and
Patrick Harnacher, were Caucasian and were denied admission to the University of Michigan.162
The record was clear that if both of the prospective students were one of the specifically listed
minority groups, they would have been admitted to the University.163 The University had a scheme
in which minority groups were given a discrete number of points in a selection index.164 The Court
held that the scheme was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the
University’s interest in diversity.165
The majority concluded that the admissions policy did not provide any “individualized
consideration” because it automatically awarded 20 points to every underrepresented minority
without any consideration of the individual merits of their application.166 The large amount of
points awarded had the effect of making race decisive in the decision to admit a student. 167
Therefore, the system was not the least restrictive means.
Justice Thomas filed a short concurrence in this case. He explained that he “would hold
that a State’s use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause.”168 Thomas further explained that the scheme used by Michigan’s
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts falls because it did not allow for “consideration of
nonracial distinctions among underrepresented minority applicants.”169
The Court’s decision earlier that day, in Grutter v. Bollinger, reached an opposite
conclusion. In Grutter, the Court considered the admissions policy of the law school which had a
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separate admissions system of seeking to achieve a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minorities.170 Unlike the scheme in Gratz, the law school’s policy did not assign a discrete value
to underrepresented minorities, but rather conducted a “flexible assessment” of variables beyond
just GPA and LSAT score, with race being one of the variables considered. 171 The Court adopted
wholesale Justice Powell’s decision in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,172 which found that
“student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.”173 The majority distinguished this system from unconstitutional quota or racial
balancing systems, hinging its decision on the fact that the university sought a “critical mass” of
students, which “is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce,” which the majority found to be substantial.174 Thus, because race was considered as part
of a larger, individualized inquiry, and because race was used in a “flexible, nonmechanical way,”
the Court found the plan to be sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.175
Justice Thomas, strongly opposed to affirmative action, wrote an elaborate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Thomas began his opinion by citing to one of Frederick
Douglass’s speeches, in which Douglass stated that he was not asking for “benevolence” or “pity,”
but simply for African-Americans to be left alone.176 After citing this passage, Thomas explained
that he, like Douglass, believes that “blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without
the meddling of university administrators.”177 Thomas then explained his view that this policy is
an exercise in racial discrimination, no different than an obviously unconstitutional scheme of
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having a heightened standard for minority students and a lower standard for everyone else. 178 In
Thomas’s view, they are flip sides of the same coin, racial discrimination is racial discrimination,
and it is unconstitutional in all its forms.
Part I of Thomas’s opinion begins by collecting cases on the Court’s former treatment of
racial classifications. Only the government’s interest in national security179 has been held to be
sufficiently compelling to discriminate based on race.180 By contrast, the University’s interest in a
diverse student body does not rise to the same level as the government’s interest in national
security.
In part II of his opinion, Thomas closely examined the University’s proposed interest,
namely obtaining the “educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.”181 Thomas
explained that diversity, for its own sake, is not the compelling interest asserted by the University;
rather, diversity is simply the means to achieve the University’s interest, which is to improve the
education at the law school.182 The law school believed that the only way to reach this educational
benefit was to achieve a racially mixed student body.183 Therefore, in Thomas’s view, what the
Court really upheld was the “use of racial discrimination as a tool to advance the Law School’s
interest in offering a marginally superior education while maintaining an elite institution.”184
Thomas explained that the fundamental flaw in the majority’s reasoning was that by
adopting Justice Powell’s opinion, it allows the Court to engage in an ad hoc, “know it when we
see it” approach to determining whether a compelling interest exists, which is inherently
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unworkable.185 Here, the majority expanded “the range of permissible uses of race to something
as trivial . . . as the assembling of a law school class” and maintaining a public and elite law school,
for which there is no pressing necessity, and certainly not a compelling interest.186 Even to the
extent there is an interest in having a law school, or elite law school, Michigan has failed to state
a cognizable interest because the vast majority of the students who attend the University of
Michigan do not remain in state to practice law.187 Therefore, in Thomas’s view, the University
could not assert a compelling interest and, as a result, “should be forced to choose between its
classroom aesthetic and its exclusionary admissions system,” as proper application of strict
scrutiny would not allow the University to maintain its prestige at the expense of a least restrictive
alternative.188
Finally, Thomas explained that the majority’s opinion presupposes that the Law School’s
admission program actually benefits the minority students who are admitted as a result of the
program.189 The program, Thomas points out, does not look for students who will actually succeed
in the practice of law, but just seeks a class that “looks right, even if it does not perform right.”190
The program may offer the benefits of an elite law degree, but the otherwise unprepared minority
students may find it difficult to compete.191 More than just inability to compete, the program
creates a dynamic where non-minority students feel superior to minority students, and nonminority students resent minority students for getting favorable treatment.192 Even the minority
students who are admitted without any consideration of race “are tarred as undeserving.”193
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Thomas concludes his opinion by agreeing with two of the majority’s points, namely that
discrimination between preferred minority groups is unconstitutional, and that in 25 years the
admission plan would become unconstitutional.194
The final major affirmative action opinion that Justice Thomas was involved in is Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin,195 in which he filed a concurring opinion. In Fisher, the Court
considered the admissions policy of the University of Texas which, like Grutter, considered “race
as one of various factors in its undergraduate admissions process” without assigning a particular
value to race, but making it a priority to secure a “critical mass.” 196 The Court, finding that the
Court of Appeals did not properly apply the rigorous strict scrutiny analysis, remanded the case.197
The University implemented a program in which race was not explicitly considered, but a “holistic
metric of a candidate’s potential contribution to the University” was used to give students credit
for personal experiences.198 This effort was buttressed by outreach programs by the University.199
The Texas State Legislature also enacted what was known as the Ten Percent Plan, which granted
“automatic admission to any public state college, including the University, to all students in the
top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas that comply with certain standards.”200 Finally,
after the Court’s decision in Grutter, the University began explicitly considering race as a “one of
many ‘plus factors’ in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contribution
of each candidate.”201
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The Court began its analysis by reaffirming that “obtaining the educational benefits of
‘student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.’”202 However, the means must still be narrowly tailored toward achieving that end.203
The Court noted that it applied deference to “a university’s ‘educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission,’” but that deference is not complete.204 It is for
courts to examine whether there is “no workable race-neutral” alternative that would allow the
educational benefits associated with diversity to be achieved.205 The Court of Appeals erred by
granting deference to the University when analyzing the narrowly tailored requirement.206 Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals impermissibly deferred to “the University’s good faith
in its use of racial classifications.”207
Justice Thomas filed a concurrence, agreeing that strict scrutiny was not properly applied
but noting that Grutter v. Bollinger should be overruled.208 Justice Thomas reiterated that Grutter
fell outside of the Court’s precedent insofar as it found a compelling interest in racial
discrimination for reasons unrelated to national security or remedying past discrimination.209 In
direct contravention of strict scrutiny, the Court in Grutter impermissibly deferred to the
university’s determination that racial discrimination was necessary to achieve the desired
educational benefit.210 In Fisher, Thomas similarly undertook an exacting analysis of the
University’s interest, namely its interest in “attaining ‘a diverse student body and the educational
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benefits flowing from such diversity.’”211 Analyzing the syntax, Thomas concluded that the
University had a purported interest in both “diversity for its own sake” and “attaining educational
benefits that allegedly flow from diversity.”212 First, Thomas noted that the Court has repeatedly
made clear that diversity for its own sake cannot be a compelling interest,213 and that even if
educational benefits did flow from diversity, which is unclear, it does not rise to the level of a
compelling interest.214 Thomas likened this case to Brown v. Board of Education, noting that in
Brown the Court rejected an argument by segregationists that “educational benefits justify racial
discrimination,” and the same conclusion should hold in this case.215 Relatedly, Thomas
emphasized that even if the school was faced with closure due to inability to engage in racial
discrimination, it would still be an insufficient interest to discriminate.216 Thomas mentions that
many of the same arguments the University advanced in support of its racially discriminatory
scheme parallel the arguments made by segregationists.217 For example, the University argued that
its program allows students to become better leaders in a diverse world, which parallels the
segregationist argument that segregated schools “provided more leadership opportunities for
blacks.”218 The University also contends that racial discrimination is necessary, at least in the
immediate future, “because of the enduring race consciousness of our society.”219 Thomas rejected
those arguments, and concluded that because the arguments were unavailing when they were first
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made by segregationists, there is no reason that they should be valid now to uphold a racially
discriminatory scheme.220
As in Grutter, Thomas raised the concern that “race has little to do with the alleged
educational benefits of diversity.”221 The entire notion hinges on the toxic premise that “it is
possible to tell when discrimination helps, rather than hurts, racial minorities.”222 Thomas
explained that racial discrimination can never be “good,” and can quickly lead to abuse.223 Thomas
also re-raised his concern that this racial discrimination does a disservice to minority students
because they are less prepared and end up performing worse than their classmates, and no evidence
presented by the University suggested that favored “students are able to close this substantial gap
during their time at the University.”224 Thomas contends that the students who benefit from the
University’s program are inevitably stamped with a badge of inferiority, which taints their
accomplishments.225 And finally, the harm extends beyond just the minority students who actually
benefit from the program, because there is no way to distinguish students that benefitted from the
admissions process and those that have not, so even minority students who were admitted without
consideration of race are harmed.226
2. Substantive Due Process and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
During his tenure on the Court, Thomas has steadfastly opposed the Court’s substantive
due process jurisprudence. For example, in Troxel v. Granville,227 the Court dealt with the
fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The Court was called upon to determine the
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constitutionality of a Washington statute which permitted “any person” to petition a Washington
court for visitation rights “at any time.”228 The statute gave Washington courts the power to grant
visitation rights whenever visitation, in the court’s view, would serve the best interest of the
child.229 In Troxel, the child’s parents had a relationship that ultimately ended, and the father, who
had regular visitation, ultimately committed suicide.230 After the death of the father, the children’s
mother, Tommie Granville, sought to limit the paternal grandparent’s visitation rights, and the
grandparents petitioned the court for relief.

231

Recognizing that “the State’s recognition of an

independent third-party interest in a child can place a substantial burden on the traditional parentchild relationship,” the Court was asked to decide whether, “as applied to Tommie Granville and
her family, [the Washington statute] violates the Federal Constitution.”232
The Court began its analysis by quoting the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely
that “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”233
and referenced its interpretation that the clause “includes a substantive component” that provides
heightened protection for fundamental rights and liberties.234 The majority recognized that the
liberty interest “of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children” is the “oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”235 As part of this liberty, parents have the
constitutional right to direct both the upbringing and education of their children.236 This protection
also encompasses “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
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custody, and control of their children.”237 Recognizing this broad right, the Court held that as
applied to Granville, the broadly worded Washington statute infringed on her constitutional
rights.238 The statute gives no deference whatsoever to the fit parent’s judgment as to what is best
for the child, and allows the court to disregard any decision made by the parent and award visitation
to anyone if the court decides it is in the best interest of the child.239
Thomas filed a short concurrence. He explained that he concurred in the judgment because
“neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the
original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights under that constitutional provision,” which suggests that if they had, he would have
agreed.240 Because no such challenge had been raised, the Court’s precedent recognizing the
fundamental right of parents resolved the case.241
Thomas has consistently cast doubt on recognition of unenumerated rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Thomas reaffirmed his disapproval
of substantive due process in the recent case of Perry v. New Hampshire,242 in which the Court
held that the due process clause does not require inquiry into reliability of an eyewitness
identification of a defendant when no otherwise unnecessary suggestive means were used by law
enforcement.243 Thomas filed a concurrence, again, as in Troxel, stating that assuming the Court’s
prior due process precedent is valid, the Court reached the right conclusion.244 However, Thomas
wrote separately to express the view that the Court’s prior precedents recognizing a “substantive
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due process’” right to ‘fundamental fairness’” were “wrongly decided because the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is not a ‘secret repository of substantive guarantees against
unfairness.’”245 Perhaps Thomas’s strongest stance opposing recognition of substantive rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment came in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill.,246 in which Thomas wrote “the Court has determined that the Due Process Clause
applies rights against the States that are not mentioned in the Constitution at all, even without
seriously arguing that the Clause was originally understood to protect such rights.”247 Thomas then
continued by stating that
All of this is a legal fiction. The notion that a constitutional provision
that guarantees only “process” before a person is deprived of life,
liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains
credulity for even the most casual user of words. Moreover, this
fiction is a particularly dangerous one. The one theme that links the
Court's substantive due process precedents together is their lack of
a guiding principle to distinguish “fundamental” rights that warrant
protection from nonfundamental rights that do not.248
Thomas, dissatisfied with the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, has sought to
reinvigorate the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source of protection for fundamental rights,
a source which Thomas feels is more in line with an originalist interpretation of the Constitution.
Thomas first began to examine the use of the Privileges Immunities Clause in his dissent in Saenz
v. Roe,249 and again in McDonald. In Saenz, the Court was confronted with the constitutionality of
a California statute that limited the welfare benefits that new residents of the state could collect,
which in turn saved the state a substantial amount of money.250 The Court relied on the Privileges
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and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to find the statute unconstitutional.251 The
Court explained that “the right to travel-the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges
and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State . . . is protected not only by the new
arrival’s status as a state citizen, but also by her status as a citizen of the United States.”252
Thomas dissented, explaining that the majority attributed a “meaning to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause that likely was unintended when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and
ratified.”253 Thomas noted that scholars have recognized that the Court’s decision in the SlaughterHouse Cases incorrectly interpreted the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,254 and
proceeded to look to the original meaning of the clause. Specifically, Thomas looked to an 1825
decision entitled Corfield v. Coryell, in which Justice Washington “rejected the proposition that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed equal access to all public benefits . . . that a State
chooses to make available.”255 Rather, Thomas concluded that “at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, people understood that ‘privileges or immunities of citizens’ were
fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law.” 256 Finally,
Thomas suggested that Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence should possibly displace
“portions of our equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence.”257 After hinting at
the use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Saenz, Thomas, in McDonald sought to use the
clause to incorporate the Second Amendment, and the protections of the Bill of Rights generally,
against the states, rather than the Due Process Clause.258
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C. Connick v. Thompson
One of Thomas’s more controversial opinions is Connick v. Thompson,259 in which he
wrote for the majority in a contentious 5-4 decision. The case involved a wrongful conviction of
John Thompson for armed robbery and murder, which led to him being placed on death row.260
The prosecutors in his case failed to disclose key exculpatory evidence to the defense, as required
by the Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland.261 It was not until Thompson had spent 18 years in
prison, 14 of which were on death row, and had only a month left before his scheduled execution
that his convictions were vacated.262 After being released, Thompson sued Harry Connick, who
was the District Attorney overseeing the prosecutors responsible, for damages on the theory that
he “failed to train his prosecutors adequately about their duty to produce exculpatory evidence and
that the lack of training had caused the nondisclosure in Thompson’s robbery case.”263 The
majority, led by Justice Thomas, held that the district attorney’s office could not be held liable
under Section 1983 for failure to train based on a single violation.264
Thomas began the substantive analysis by laying out the standard for a Section 1983 claim,
namely that plaintiffs must prove that the action taken by the government official or officials that
caused the injury was pursuant to a municipal policy. 265 Thomas explained that a municipal policy
may include “decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and
practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” 266 Thomas noted
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that in limited circumstances, a local government may violate Section 1983 when it fails “to train
certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights,” as such failure to train
may amount to an official government policy.267 A failure to train claim can only succeed where
the plaintiff can demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to the rights of the people affected by the
government’s conduct.268 Deliberate indifference is a high bar as it demands that the municipal
actor completely disregard the known and obvious consequences of his or her actions.269
Therefore, while a high bar, if a city is on notice, either actual or constructive, that an omission in
its training program is causing officials to violate the constitutional rights of citizens, the city can
be found liable under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference if the program is retained despite
knowledge of its unconstitutional application.270 Anything less than that exacting standard,
explained Thomas, would result in a sort of respondeat superior liability for municipalities.271
Finally, to succeed on a failure to train Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must ordinarily establish
that a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” occurred to show that
the municipality was deliberately indifferent.272
However, because Thompson could not establish such a pattern of violations, he relied on
an even more narrow theory of liability, namely the “single-incident” theory.273 The “single
incident” theory is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Canton,274 which provided an
extreme hypothetical in which no pattern of conduct would be necessary to find a violation, namely
“a city that arms its police force with firearms and deploys the armed officers into the public to
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capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of
deadly force.”275
Measured against this stringent standard, Thomas concluded that failing to train
prosecutors as to the requirements of Brady did not rise to the same degree of indifference as posed
by the Court’s hypothetical in Canton.276 Thomas reasoned that attorneys all have undertaken legal
training that has equipped them to “interpret and apply legal principles, understand constitutional
limits, and exercise legal judgment.”277 Moreover, lawyers are required in most states to satisfy
continuing legal education requirements to continue to practice law.278 Attorneys also learn on the
job from other attorneys, including in the Prosecutor’s office.279 Lawyers are also subject to
character and fitness standards both to be admitted to the bar and to maintain a level of diligence
and competence.280 Based on all of this, Thomas concluded that “[i]n light of this regime of legal
training and professional responsibility, recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious
consequence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey
the law” because they are both trained and ethically bound to understand the requirements of
Brady.281 Without evidence of recurring violations, Connick, as district attorney, was entitled to
rely on the professional training of his prosecutors.282
Thomas concluded that this situation is outside the realm of the hypothetical posed in
Canton because the hypothetical in that case “assumes that the armed police officers have no
knowledge at all of the constitutional limits on the use of deadly force” whereas it is undisputed
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that “the prosecutors in Connick’s office were familiar with the general Brady rule.”283 As a result,
there could be no finding of municipal liability in this case. Thomas finished the opinion by
addressing the dissent, which would have found liability under Canton.284 Thomas rebutted that
the dissent misses the mark because unlike the police officers in Canton, prosecutors “are equipped
with the tools to find, interpret, and apply legal principles.”285 Thomas pointed out that the dissent’s
real issue was not with the holding, but with the Court’s precedent recognizing the stringent
standard for municipality liability under Section 1983, especially in single incident cases. 286 As
such, Thompson’s large verdict was overturned.
Part III: Analysis
The first section of Part II illustrates Justice Thomas’s adherence to an originalist
perspective in interpreting the Constitution. In fact, Thomas has been described by at least one
scholar as a more faithful originalist than even Justice Scalia.287 While on the bench, Thomas has,
“[a]cross doctrinal areas . . . advocated that the Supreme Court clear away accumulated
nonoriginalist precedent to make room for the Constitution’s original meaning.” 288 Thomas has
similarly been praised by originalists for shunning “[o]ther common facets of legal interpretation,”
including “consequences, precedent, justice, legal doctrines and tests, and deference to elected
branches” where they deviate from “a faithful articulation and application of the Constitution’s
original meaning.”289 This is made clear from the sample opinions in Part II. In Doggett, for
example, Thomas strictly adhered to an originalist interpretation by surveying the original meaning
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of the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause, and found that the clause was designed to defend
against the “major evils” of ‘“undue and oppressive incarceration’ and the ‘anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation.’”290 Therefore, while the 8 ½ years during which Doggett was
not reprimanded may have amounted to government negligence or inefficiency, it did not fall
within the purview of what the Speedy Trial Clause was designed to protect, and therefore should
not have amounted to a constitutional violation.291
Moreover, Thomas’s opinions in both Doggett and McMillian illustrate that Thomas,
perhaps even at the expense of justice, strictly adheres to the original interpretation of the meaning
of the Constitution. In Doggett, Thomas made clear that by failing to look at original meaning of
the Speedy Trial Clause, the Court effectively divorced “the Speedy Trial Clause from all
considerations of prejudice to an accused,” and “invites the Nation’s judges to indulge in an ad
hoc and result-driven second-guessing of the government’s investigatory efforts,” a role that was
not intended by the Constitution.292 In Thomas’s view, Constitutional protections are not designed
to give judges the authority to reach arbitrary conclusions based on their own judgment; rather,
constitutional protections are ingrained by history, to be understood in the manner in which the
framers intended. This is not to say that other remedies are unavailable, such as statutes of
limitations, but the specific remedy sought was not available under the Speedy Trial Clause. 293
Thomas’s opinion in McMillian is a further illustration of this. McMillian is described as
one of Thomas’s most “controversial” opinions,294 but in reality it is just an example of Thomas
adhering to his originalist principles, and like Doggett, finding that the facts of the particular case
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did not fall within the traditional protections of the constitutional provision at issue. In McMillian,
Thomas recognized that while Hudson was injured by prison officials, it was not the type of injury
or mistreatment that traditionally falls under the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the
Eighth Amendment.295 The framers simply did not intend to encompass anything less than
“significant injury,” so despite the fact that the conduct of the officers was immoral or even
tortious, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.296 Thus, despite the deplorable
nature of the facts, the Court in its opinion, as in Doggett, expanded the framer’s conception of
cruel and unusual punishment and espoused the view “that the Federal Constitution must address
all ills in our society,” and that is not its function.297 Rather, Thomas’s view is that regardless of
how provocative the facts are, the Constitution should be interpreted according to its original
meaning. Thomas received heavy criticism for his dissent in McMillian,298 as many
mischaracterized the opinion “as indifference to the torture of inmates.”299 Later, Thomas would
refer to his decision in McMillian as an “opinion that is trotted out for propaganda.”300 A close
reading of Thomas’s opinion reveals that it is not because Thomas lacked empathy for the plaintiff,
but that the specific constitutional remedy plaintiff was seeking was not contemplated by the
framers.
The final case in Part II that demonstrates Thomas’s adherence to originalism is Wilson v.
Arkansas.301 There too, Thomas upheld the knock and announce principle by surveying the
common law and determining that the requirement that police “knock and announce” their
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presence was specifically contemplated in English common law and at the time of the framing.302
Thomas’s stern adherence to originalism as seen in Doggett, McMillian, and Wilson is the product
of Thomas’s belief in judicial restraint and strict interpretation of constitutional text. Thomas’s
stern upbringing by his grandfather has ingrained in him the ability to adhere to his principles and
stand for what he believes in, even in the face of adversity.303 As Thomas explained during an
interview he did on 60 Minutes, “[t]he Constitution is what matters. Not my personal views,
whatever they may be.”304
This segues into another major line of cases in which Thomas has taken a definitive stand,
namely his interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thomas’s views on the Equal Protection
Clause are intricately tied to his life experiences, which has drawn criticism as Thomas normally
seeks to divorce his personal views from constitutional interpretation.305 Thomas has sought to
dovetail originalism with his view of a colorblind constitution, which has also drawn criticism
from some scholars.306 However, a close examination of Thomas’s interpretation of the
Constitution shows that his Equal Protection jurisprudence comports with his originalist
interpretation of the Constitution.307 The starting point of each of his affirmative action decisions
is that the Constitution is “color-blind,” and that any use of race requires application of strict
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scrutiny.308 This is derived from his belief that original intent of the farmers, in drafting the
Constitution, was to bring about the natural rights and protections listed in the Declaration of
Independence. Even so, it is undoubtedly true that Thomas’s personal experiences with affirmative
action have influenced his opinions on affirmative action by universities.
When Thomas applied to Yale Law School, there was a program in place in which the
school set aside “up to 10 percent of the places in the entering class for members of minority
groups, who would compete against each other, rather than whites, for those slots.”309 As a result,
Thomas was ridiculed at Yale by white students and even professors who berated him for only
being there because he was black, which infuriated Thomas.310 While at Yale, Thomas felt that
instead of being respected, he was pitied by whites around him, and felt he constantly had
something to prove to white students and professors.311 The stigma of affirmative action extended
beyond just fellow students at Yale, when Thomas arrived to work for Senator Danforth as a
legislative assistant, he was told by a staffer that the only reason he was there was because he went
to Yale, and that the only reason he went to Yale was because of affirmative action, not ability.312
Thus, affirmative action was a specter that has haunted Thomas throughout his entire career, and
which would later influence his jurisprudence on the Court.
For example, in Grutter, Thomas noted that government’s use of race has hurt minority
students by projecting them into a competitive environment for which they are not prepared and,
by admitting students who would not have otherwise been admitted, tars all minority students as
“undeserving.”313 Thomas’s view is that there is no such thing as benign discrimination, it will
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always bring about negative consequences.314 What is more, the university itself was not interested
in the actual advancement of these minority students, but rather is interested in aesthetics, namely
having a class that “looks right, even if it does not perform right.”315 Thomas wrote an even more
fervent opinion in Fisher,316 in which he argued that the justifications for affirmative action was
similar to the arguments advanced by proponents of school segregation in Brown v. Board of
Education and that the Court rejected those arguments then as it should now.317 Thomas again
emphasized that diversity for its own sake has no “educational benefit,” and that the system serves
to cause more harm than good to the minority students who are actually admitted.318
Thomas’s overtures in both opinions emphasize his resentment toward affirmative action
while at Yale, which he states rendered his degree worth only “15 cents” due to his inability to
find employment after graduating.319 In Thomas’s memoir, he recounts that he felt he was being
judged by a “double standard” while at Yale.320 Thomas felt that the racial preferences used by
Yale devalued his achievement of graduating from an elite law school.321 Thus, when confronted
with the issue of the constitutionality of affirmative action on the Supreme Court, Thomas opposed
such programs, realizing that admission to schools under such a scheme is really only a pyrrhic
victory for minority students, and serves only to further stack the odds against them. Further,
Thomas’s opinions shed light on his uneasiness with the idea that racial segregation can be “good,”
noting that often times the well-intentioned assistance may really be cloaking otherwise self-
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interested motives by legislatures or universities.322 Thus, while Thomas has offered an originalist
interpretation of a “color blind” constitution, his opinions on affirmative action drift away from
strong adherence to originalism and clearly touch on, and are influenced by, his own experience
with affirmative action.
As Part II demonstrates, Thomas is staunchly opposed to recognition of substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.323 Such an interpretation, according to Thomas,
is divorced from original meaning of the Constitution and gives judges unbridled discretion.324
However, Thomas has sought through his jurisprudence to revive the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as a way to incorporate the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. Thomas
believes that reinvigorating the Privileges and Immunities Clause is more in line with an originalist
interpretation and is a less circuitous route to protecting the substantive rights. 325 Taking this
position, however, would require the Court to overhaul its entire Privileges and Immunities
jurisprudence.326
Thomas’s dissent in Saenz v. Roe327 established his view of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, which he would later expand upon in McDonald. In Saenz, Thomas observed that the
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Slaughter-House Cases328 “all but read the Privileges and Immunities Clause out of the
Constitution.”329 However, in Saenz, Thomas urged the Court to reconsider the scope of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause in order to incorporate substantive protections and possibly even
displace portions of the Court’s current “equal protection and substantive due process
jurisprudence.”330 Thomas makes his position clear in his opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
in which he further advocates for the Privileges and Immunities Clause to be the center of
substantive protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.331 In McDonald, the majority held that
“the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause because it is ‘fundamental’ to the American ‘scheme of ordered liberty.’”332
Thomas, strongly opposed to the majority’s use of the Due Process Clause as the means to uphold
the right to bear arms as against the States, sought through his opinion in McDonald to use the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as the means to incorporate the Second Amendment’s right to
bear arms against the states. After a lengthy discussion of the original intent of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Thomas concluded that the Privileges and Immunities Clause should uphold,
at minimum, “those fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution against the States,
including the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.”333
Thomas took an interest in the Declaration of Independence and the natural rights it
establishes early in his career as a means to “synthesize his love of country with the AfricanAmerican experience, which in many ways was hostile to such nationalism.”334 While at the

328

The Court, in the Slaughter-House Cases, interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment narrowly to apply to only national citizenship, and not state citizenship. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872).
329
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521.
330
Id.
331
See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805 (Thomas J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
332
Id. at 806.
333
Id. at 835 (Thomas J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
334
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 305.

41

EEOC, Thomas began to seriously formulate this theory, which rejected the view, articulated in
Dred Scott, that “the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to extend the same rights to blacks
as to whites” in favor of a view that the original intent of the Constitution is to be read in light of
the Declaration of Independence, which pointed toward abolition of slavery.335 This interpretation
of the Constitution lies at the heart of Thomas’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, from Equal
Protection, to substantive due process, to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The starting point
of Thomas’s analysis derives from Justice Harlan’s view in dissent in Plessy, namely that the
Constitution is color blind and is “dedicated to the universal principles of equality and liberty for
all American citizens irrespective of race.”336 The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, must be read
as an extension “of the promise of the original Constitution which in turn was intended to fulfill
the promise of the Declaration.”337 Based on this understanding, any affirmative action programs
cannot be constitutional because favoring certain races over others, even if seemingly benign, is
out of touch with the framers intent of the Constitution. Moreover, the original intent of the framers
suggests that the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be the basis for protecting the
substantive rights of individuals against the States, not the due process clause.
The final major opinion in Part II is Connick,338 in which Thomas wrote a controversial
opinion for the majority. Similar to McMillian, Thomas came under fire almost immediately after
the Connick decision came down.339 Nevertheless, Thomas, in a thoroughly reasoned opinion,
overturned the jury verdict. Thomas recognized that the claim Thompson was making was evoking
a very narrow claim for relief, namely a single incident theory of failure of oversight under Section
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1983. Despite the sympathetic nature of the facts, Thomas stuck to the law and precedent to
determine that the Court’s jurisprudence mandated the otherwise unpopular result. The Court’s
precedent, having left open only a very small window for such liability, simply did not reach the
facts of this case. Thomas’s decision in Connick represents a data point in Thomas’s overall ability
to hold his ground on what he believes is right. Thomas has suffered many criticisms while on the
Court, ranging from his silence at oral argument340 to the reasoning in his opinions. However,
Thomas remains steadfast in the face of criticism, affirming that “when you're dealing with things
that are matters of principle or matters of fact, that you can spend a lot of time worrying about
what critics say. You have to do your job. My grandfather never worried about it. You've got to
do what's right. You don't engage in this type of pettiness."341
Part IV: Conclusion
Thomas’s unique experiences as an American have allowed him to craft a unique
jurisprudence and approach to constitutional interpretation. As an African-American conservative,
Thomas has relied on natural law and the Declaration of Independence to align those two distinct
points of his identity and develop his judicial philosophy. As a conservative, Thomas has
developed and rigorously adhered to an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, even at the
expense of overruling Court precedent. As an African-American who has experienced pernicious
racial discrimination in both academia and elsewhere, Thomas has strongly opposed use of racial
discrimination, even if seemingly benign, as constitutionally infirm. Thomas, hardened by a strict
upbringing under his grandfather, has learned to stand on principle, even in the face of adversity,
as evidenced by the Anita Hill hearings. Thomas has remained steadfast in the face of criticism,
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namely of his silence on the bench and disagreement with opinions, and criticism by the black
community. Unshaken by such criticism, Thomas will go forward and continue to advocate his
views and principles on the bench, seeking to ground Constitutional interpretation in the intent of
the framers.
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